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ABSTRACT: this paper focuses on the oecd role with reference 
to the elaboration of multilateral norms concerning the discipline of 
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promotional approach and regulatory one, it aims to analyze how the 
oecd activities fulfill the need for balancing the economic rights of the 
private investors with the host state’s public interests. in particular, while 
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showing how the previous oecd attempts to elaborate a multilateral 
Agreement on investment (forward mAi) were primarily concerned 
with the promotion of developed countries’ strategic economic sectors, 
it finds that the guidelines for multinational enterprises also take into 
consideration the protection of numerous “public goods”. however, 
the gap which remains in the discipline of international investments 
could be filled by these guidelines only through their incorporation 
into binding legal instruments.
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RESUMEN: este artículo versa sobre el rol de la ocde en lo relati-
vo a la elaboración de normas multilaterales sobre la regulación de 
inversiones extranjeras directas. particularmente, al distinguir entre 
una aproximación promocional y una regulatoria, pretende analizar 
cómo la actuación de la ocde cumple con la necesidad de ponderar 
los derechos económicos de los inversores privados con los intereses 
públicos del estado anfitrión. particularmente, al tiempo que muestra 
cómo los intentos anteriores de la ocde de elaborar un Acuerdo 
multilateral sobre inversión se preocupaban principalmente de la pro-
moción de sectores económicos estratégicos de países desarrollados, 
descubre que las directrices para empresas multinacionales también 
toman en consideración la protección de numerosos “bienes públicos”. 
sin embargo, el vacío que subsiste en la regulación de inversiones 
internacionales puede ser cubierto por estas directrices sólo a través 
de su incorporación en instrumentos jurídicos vinculantes.
PALABRAS CLAVE: inversiones internacionales – Acuerdo multilateral 
sobre inversión – directrices de la ocde para empresas multinacionales 
– aproximación reguladora – aproximación promocional
INTRODUCTION
over the past few decades, there has been an increasing interest in the 
implications that result from an unbalanced and sectorial regulation of inter-
national investments.1 it has been widely recognized that the contribution of 
foreign companies, in terms of capital, infrastructure and know-how, can be an 
important source for the socioeconomic progress of the developing and least 
1 Economou et al. (2008 – 2009) pp. 3 – 33.
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developed countries, once it is channelled into an adequate regulatory fra-
mework.2 however, given the legal and institutional deficiencies of several low 
per-capita economies, frequently the flux of foreign capital is not regulated in 
line with the achievement of national objectives. it is indeed not a coincidence 
that multinational companies often decide to invest in those countries for so-
called cost saving reasons.
in the absence of adequate national legislations, the international law should 
ensure a fair and satisfactory balancing of the interests concerned, by promo-
ting, along with a greater liberalization and economic integration, standards for 
the protection of the public interests. however, after the failure to conclude a 
multilateral Agreement on investment (mAi) within the organisation for economic 
co-operation and development (oecd), there is currently no adequate way of 
regulating foreign direct investments (fdis) at multilateral level. therefore, the 
fragmentation of the discipline is accompanied by both an excessive focus on 
promoting cross-border investments and a limited ability to protect public goods 
such as natural heritage, cultural diversity and democracy. in other words, the 
promotional approach prevails over the regulatory one.
furthermore, the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008 frustrated any hope as to the 
possibility that the doha development round would be concluded by the end 
of the past decade, as well as any confidence that the fdis would feature on the 
negotiating agenda, following the decision to abandon it in 2004.3 thus, pending 
future developments, only two world trade organization (wto) Agreements 
are interested in the issue of fdis: the Agreement regarding the trade-related 
investment measures (trims) and the general Agreement on trade in service 
(gAts). these latter, however, address the issue only with reference to those 
aspects of investments related to trade.
if, in the short term, the possibility of extending the mandate of the wto 
has vanished, the economic recovery has led to a return of investment flows to 
pre-crisis levels between 2010 and 2011, registering a sharp increase in transac-
tions between emerging countries.4 emerging economies, especially china and 
2 aakEn (2008) pp. 91 – 130, aguilar y oyarzún (2011) pp. 579 – 605, aguilar y parkEr (2003) 
pp. 365 – 407, cosbEy et al (2004) p. 46, DolzEr y schrEuEr (2012) p. 46, Dupuy (2009) pp. 
45 – 63, libErTi (2007) pp. 791 – 852, Fry (2007 – 2008) pp. 77 – 149.
3 world trade organization (wto), Doha Work Programme, relationship between trade and 
investment (2004, wt/l/579), in which it has been stated that: “(…) the Council agrees that 
these issues, mentioned in the Doha Ministerial Declaration in paragraphs 20 – 22, 23 – 25 
and 26 respectively, will not form part of the Work Programme set out in that Declaration 
and therefore no work towards negotiations on any of these issues will take place within 
the Wto during the Doha round (…)”.
4 unctAd (2011) 250 p.
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india, are showing a greater resilience than their industrialized counterparts.5 this 
is allowing an acceleration of the phenomenon, already in progress for several 
years, whereby Asian investors are slowly replacing those coming from the united 
states and the european union (eu) in relevant economic areas.6 while it can 
be assumed that this activism has positive implications for developing and least 
developed countries’ economic growth, it can also be seen as a major risk for 
the development of a balanced discipline of international investments. in fact, 
despite the growing interest of the oecd countries on the negative effects of 
the establishment of multinational enterprises in the territory of countries whose 
legal apparatus are characterized by an evident legislation weakness, it seems 
that Asian countries are not willing to follow these new trends. today, therefore, 
oecd countries are facing with a double challenge: ensuring that the discipline 
of international investment addresses the protection of public interests and, at 
the same time, dealing with the competition coming mainly from china.
I. ThE MULTILATERAL AgREEMENT ON INVESTMENT
since the late ‘60s, following a period in which it seemed that the tensions 
between industrialized countries and developing countries had reached a point 
of no return, there has been a phase in which the rapid expansion of fdis has 
been followed by attempts to develop and codify provisions intended to regu-
late fdis access and treatment.7 the oecd has been a pioneer in addressing 
this issue.8 Already in 1961, it created the codes of liberalization of capital 
movements and current invisible operations, in order to remove the controls 
over bank accounts. Although the codes, and the associated guidelines, were 
significant in promoting more open international capital markets, they represented 
however a minimum result in terms of the main objective of the organization: 
to bring unity to the myriad of bilateral investment Agreements (bits) governing 
the issue of cross-border investments.9
in may 1995, the oecd launched the negotiations on the adoption of a 
multilateral agreement on fdis. this event was undoubtedly a unique oppor-
tunity for the formation of general rules designed to regulate both the phase 
of liberalization and the protection of international investments. the mAi, in 
theory, would have to raise the standards of protection for foreign investors 
through two key principles: i) national treatment and, ii) most favored nation 
5 ayhan y prasaD (2010) pp. 6 – 10.
6 Economic commission For laTin amErica anD ThE caribbEan, Foreign Direct investment in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 2011 y undp (2007).
7 gEigEr (1998) pp. 467 et seq.
8 JuillarD (1998) pp. 477 – 484.
9 cannEr (1998) pp. 657 – 682.
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(mfn). the negotiations were held between 1995 and 1998 but never exceeded 
the planning stage. there were concerns, for example, from france,10 as to the 
possible negative effects that the mAi would have on the access and treatment of 
foreign investments in sectors considered strategic for the transalpine economy, 
such as the audiovisual one. equally, the project raised concerns from several 
oecd non-member countries, given its ability to undermine their prospect of 
socio-economic development, considering also that they did not play any role 
in the negotiation phase.11
1. Purpose and discipline
the purpose of the mAi was very ambitious: create a multilateral legal 
basis for the entire discipline of international investments. the Agreement was 
built along the lines of the us model of bits, as based on the obligation of non-
discrimination.12 in this sense, while the host state was not required to accept 
the foreign investor on an unconditional basis, it was obliged to regulate its 
access and establishment in a non-discriminatory manner with respect to both 
domestic and foreign investors.13 thus, unlike many other bits, the application 
of the provisions of national treatment and mfn were not contingent upon the 
effective establishment of the foreign investor in the host country, working instead 
from the market access phase. this was in order to ensure an even higher level of 
protection for the foreign enterprises. moreover, if the wto Agreements ensured 
a “bottom up” protection (only the areas specifically mentioned fall within the 
scope of the Agreements), the mAi approach was “top down”. this meant that 
the Agreement, by definition, applied to all economic areas, unless through a 
specific reserve the contracting party could suspend its application to a given 
branch of the national economy. the mAi was then a horizontal Agreement, in 
contrast with the partial approach used in the wto.
A second issue concerned with the fact that the drafters of the mAi wel-
comed a definition of investment that went far beyond the traditional concept 
of fdis (establishment of branches and subsidiaries, acquisition of permanent 
interests in local companies, purchase of material goods), to include also finan-
cial investments14. so it was much easier for companies operating abroad to be 
included among the beneficiaries of the mAi protection.15
10 lang J., “L’ami, c’est l’ennemi”, Le Monde, 10th february 1998.
11 zDEnEk (1998) pp. 4 et seq.
12 vanDEvElDE (1992).
13 valEnTi (2009) pp. 22 et seq.
14 sTumbErg (1998) pp. 491 – 598.
15 nascimbEnE (1984) 591 p.
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coming to the expropriation and compensation rules, according to the mAi 
the expropriation (or any other measures having equivalent effects) was allowed 
only if: i) needed for safeguarding a public interest, ii) applied in a non-discri-
minatory way, iii) followed by the payment of a prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation, iv) carried out in accordance with the rule of the due process 
of law. in addition, art. 2, title iV, specified the meaning of prompt, adequate 
and effective and due process of law. first: i) Prompt indicated without delay, ii) 
Adequate meant that compensation should be equivalent to the market value of 
the property expropriated, referring to the time immediately preceding the act of 
expropriation, iii) effective meant that compensation should be fully realizable 
and freely transferable. second, the concept of due process should be interpreted 
as widely as possible, in order to guarantee the investor to effectively enforce 
its procedural rights without discrimination. given the above, it was clear that, 
even during the pathological relationships between the host state and foreign 
investor, the mAi was inclined towards the full protection of the private rights 
by: (i) clarifying the conditions under which a confiscatory measure could be 
considered as lawful (effectively limiting the freedom of the host state in certain 
pre-determined circumstances); (ii) embracing the famous cordell hull formula,16 
as regards the quantum of the compensation; (iii) clarifying the procedural rights 
of the foreign investor.
As far as the regime of exceptions under the mAi is concerned, the 
contracting parties could limit the applicability of the national treatment and 
mfn principles only for reasons of national security or maintenance of inter-
national peace.17 the introduction of a third category of exceptions was also 
discussed (the so-called “cultural exception”, designed to protect linguistic and 
cultural diversity). however, in order to avoid an excessive use of this excep-
tional regime, even before the negotiations broke down, it was decided not to 
include the cultural exception in the text of the treaty. moreover, demonstrating 
the will to provide a general application of the principles of non-discrimination, 
the exceptions were operable only where it was necessary “(…) to prevent any 
Contracting Party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests; to require any Contracting Party to 
furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure of which it considers 
contrary to its essential security interests; to prevent any Contracting Party from 
16 from the name of the united states secretary of state cordell hull, who stated that, following 
the adoption by mexico of a general program of nationalizations and expropriations in 1936 
and according to the general international law, in case of expropriation the state would 
have paid an “adequate, effective and prompt” compensation. see cosTamagna (2008) pp. 
245 – 281.
17 WallacE y bailEy (1998) pp. 615 et seq.
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taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the united nations Charter 
for the maintenance of international peace and security (…)”.
finally, pursuant to article 90, the parties could grant either to local or fo-
reign businesses a more favorable treatment than their competitors, in violation 
of the principles of mfn and national treatment, only if the measure had been 
previously agreed and, consequently, inserted in an ad hoc Annex.
2. Brief remarks
the failure of the mAi negotiations demonstrates the difficulty in reconciling 
the needs of different contracting parties in a highly sensitive area such as foreign 
investments. this is mainly because the economic and commercial relationships 
between the investor and the host state are characterized by a medium-long 
term duration, affecting in a durable manner the economic, social and political 
environment of the country hosting the investment. it is clear that the needs of 
developing and least developed countries had been generally neglected in the 
oecd negotiations. Apart from the preamble, in which the parties expressly 
recognized the importance of investment as regards i) the development of their 
economies, ii) the efficient use of the economic resources, iii) the creation of 
jobs, iv) the improvement of the living standards, the mAi essentially reflected the 
American approach,18 aimed at extending the principles of non-discrimination at 
all different stages of investment. it is not an accident that, during the negotiation 
phase, it was strongly opposed by several non-governmental organizations 
(ngos).19 furthermore, the mAi had shown all its regulatory deficiencies, gi-
ven the absence of any reference to the behavior of multinational corporations 
in foreign territories. for instance, the Agreement lacked any mention to other 
international instruments relating to workers’ rights, using a general language, 
without specific legal value. by the same token, the mAi did contain neither 
environmental standards nor any reference to the concept of corporate social 
responsibility. moreover, thanks to the inclusion of financial investments within 
the scope of the Agreement, if it were actually entered into force, it would have 
increased the risk of “sealing” for the economies involved.
Although the mAi represented a missed opportunity to develop a multi-
lateral agreement governing the entire subject of international investments, for 
the above described reasons, it is believed that its entry into force would create 
more hindrances than enhancements for countries’ development and public 
18 scholz (1998) pp. 485 et seq.
19 graham (1998) pp. 599 – 614, TiElEman (2000) pp. 6 – 7.
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interest protection. As stated by influential doctrine, its only goal was to ensure 
a world “safe for foreign investments”.20
II. ThE OECD gUIDELINES fOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
the oecd has been concerned with the issue of international investments 
not only as regards the mere promotion of fdis, acting as a forum for the mAi 
negotiations, but also with reference to the regulation of the conduct of mul-
tinational enterprises abroad. here we focus on the so called guidelines for 
multinational enterprises. Adopted in June 1976, there were recommendations, 
which fall within negotiations between the governments of the oecd member 
states, having the ultimate goal of directing multinational enterprises to respect 
certain standards. from a structural point of view, the text is divided into two 
sections. the first concerns the so-called substantial part, characterized by a 
list of principles governing the conduct of multinational enterprises. the second 
focuses on the implementation procedures of the guidelines.
1. Substantial part
the broad perspective of the guidelines, where they attempt to fill the 
gaps of the multilateral regulation of fdis, is evident in the existence of chapters 
relating to a series of topics, ranging from the protection of human rights and the 
environment21 to industrial relations22 and consumer rights. the substantial part, 
in fact, is divided into the following subsections: i) concepts and principles, ii) 
general policies, iii) disclosure, iv) human rights, v) employment and industrial 
relations, vi) environment, vii) combating bribery, extortion and solicitation bribe, 
viii) consumer interests, ix) science and technology, x) competition, xi) taxation.
firstly, the text recognizes, in the chapter on concepts and principles, the 
separate legal personality of multinational corporations, by analyzing them not 
as a single entity, but as a set of companies belonging to parent enterprises, 
usually instituted in different states. the text aims to overcome the legal obs-
tacles related to both the lack of a single legal personality under national law 
and the absence of legal personality under international law, in order to better 
reflect the existing financial and personal ties among the various companies. 
this approach is confirmed in the chapter on general policies, which provide 
some standards, particularly in areas where are already pre-existing forms of 
coordination amid member states. Although the guidelines view the states as 
20 schnEiDErman (2000) pp. 757 – 787.
21 vEnDzulEs (2010) pp. 451 – 489, morgEra (2006) pp. 751 – 777.
22 ulbrich (2004) pp. 366 – 384, campbEll (1983).
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the primary responsible for the implementation of the standards of conduct, they 
clarify that this circumstance must not be interpreted as lowering the sense of 
responsibility of multinational enterprises.
on the contrary, according to text of the guidelines, enterprises “(…) should 
be viewed as partners with government in the development and use of both 
voluntary and regulatory approaches (of which the Guidelines are one element) 
to policies affecting them. there should not be any contradiction between the 
activity of multinational enterprises (Mnes) and sustainable development, and 
the Guidelines are meant to foster complementarities in this regard (…)”. this 
approach is confirmed by the principles governing the liability of corporate 
executives. the guidelines recommend, in fact, that the signatory states adopt 
legislation to clarify the terms that create a link between the positions held by 
managing directors and the conduct of the company. the purpose of this pro-
vision is to encourage a regime in which the administrators are accountable to 
third parties for the acts carried out by the company, while reinforcing the well-
known concept of corporate social responsibility.23 these principles, which 
have the potential to imply a radical change in the corporate law framework 
of the signatory states, have the ultimate goal to enable and facilitate a control 
over the activities of international companies. specifically, they are functional 
to the respect and implementation of the standards contained in the guidelines.
not surprisingly, even in those chapters concerning compliance with envi-
ronmental parameters (as well as human rights and industrial relations), a special 
emphasis is placed on the fact that companies, as well as states, are required 
to comply with the standards contained in text of the guidelines. equally, the 
chapter on human rights, while asserting that states “(…) have the duty to pro-
tect human rights (…)”, it stresses that companies “(…) regardless of their size, 
sector, operational context, ownership and structure, should respect human 
rights wherever they operate (…)”.
Accordingly, if a state fails to enforce national laws or implement interna-
tional standards on human rights, this does not imply that the expectations for 
multinational companies to respect human rights are lowered. even in those 
countries whose domestic laws are particularly weak in terms of human rights, 
the guidelines expressly provide that companies have to make reference to in-
ternational legal instruments “(…) expressed in the international Bill of Human 
rights, consisting of the universal Declaration of Human rights and the main 
instruments through which it has been codified: the international Covenant on 
Civil and Political rights and the international Covenant on economic, social 
23 oEcD (2001) pp. 29 – 77.
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and Cultural rights, and to the principles concerning fundamental rights set out 
in the 1998 international Labour organization Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and rights at Work (…)”.
to that extent, paragraph V is of particular interest because it requires mul-
tinational companies to undertake a due diligence assessment of the impact of 
their conduct on human rights. upon completion of this process, companies 
should not pursue activities contrary to the results of the due diligence assessment. 
in this sense, therefore, companies are not only required to comply with the 
standards contained in the guidelines, but also to engage in purposeful actions, 
becoming the main protagonists of the text of the recommendations.
2. Procedural part
the second section concerns the so-called guidelines control procedure 
(better known as follow-up). in accordance with this section, states are required 
to exhaust the procedures set out in the guidelines, without being bound to 
their results. the procedure is based on the dialogue between companies and 
national or supranational bodies. in particular, member states should establish 
national contact points (ncp), through which the behavior of the firms can be 
monitored.
the ncps are required, in particular, to collect information and report to 
oecd investment committee on the outcome of their activities. in carrying out 
their activities, the ncp must be properly assisted by their governments, which 
are expected to follow four criteria: visibility, accessibility, transparency and 
accountability. the oecd investment committee, for its part, has to express 
its opinion on: i) the activities conducted by the ncp, ii) the interpretation and 
application of the guidelines.
despite the limitations related to the intrinsic non-binding character of the 
guidelines (which precludes the committee from acting as a court of law or 
semi-judicial body) what allows watching this soft law instruments as a possible 
starting point for the future development of binding codes is the above-described 
control procedure. the guidelines also appear to be of principal importance 
in the light of the introduction of a series of innovative concepts in the field 
of international investments. Yet the fact remains that only by translating them 
into conventional norms they can aspire to fill the gap that remains in the rules 
governing international investments.24
24 oEcD (2006) 45 p.
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CONCLUSIONS
the article has documented the clear asymmetry existing at multilateral 
level between the promotion and protection of private interests of the foreign 
investor, on the one hand, and protection of the host state’s public interests, on 
the other. multinational companies are protected by binding legal instruments, 
considering that countries usually conclude investment treaties requiring host 
states to respect the mfn and national treatment principles, while the public 
interests of the community are sheltered only through non-binding measures. 
it is doubtless that this disproportion has arisen from a vision of economic and 
trade relations based on the idea of  the “free market without rules”. however, it is 
becoming abundantly evident that the 2007 – 2008 financial crises as well as the 
subsequent sovereign debt crisis have put an end to this idea of  doing business.
the influx of capitals and the conspicuous presence of foreign investors 
have been discovered important for the socio-economic development of recipient 
countries only with reference to those states which have been able to direct 
these capitals towards the achievement of national objectives. At this point, it 
is crucial to align law with economy to ensure that, in the future, the wealth 
of opportunities offered by globalization are shared equally amidst all parties 
involved. without further progress in this field, the contribution of fdis to the 
socioeconomic growth of the developing and least developed countries will 
remain elusive. pressing forward with the adoption of rules concerning the pro-
tection of public goods is becoming essential for the achievement of real social 
and democratic reforms. it could also represent a tool for the improvement of 
the political and economic role of the oecd countries in the international arena.
BIBLIOgRAPhY CITED
aakEn, Anne Van (2008): “fragmentation of international law”, the Finnish 
Yearbook of international Law (vol. 17): pp. 91 – 130.
aguilar ÁlvarEz, guillermo and park, william (2003): “the new face of investment 
arbitration: nAftA chapter 11”, the Yale Journal of international Law (vol. 
28 n° 2): pp. 365 – 407.
aguilar ÁlvarEz, guillermo and oyarzún monTT, santiago (2011): “investments, 
fair and equitable treatment, and the principle of “respect for the integrity 
of the law of the host state”, arsanJani, mahnoush, cogan Jacob y sloanE 
robert, WiEssnEr, siegfried (authors) Looking to the Future: essays on 
international Law in Honor of W. Michael reisman (leiden, martinus nijhoff 
publishers) pp. 579 – 605.
20
Tavassi, Jacopo (2013): El rol dE la ocdE En la Elaboración dE normas 
mulTilaTEralEs sobrE invErsionEs ExTranJEras dirEcTas: un conTrasTE
ayhan kosE, m. and prasaD, eswar (2010): “emerging markets, come of Age”, 
emerging Markets. A place at the table (vol. 47 n° 4): pp. 6 – 10.
campbEll, duncan (1983): Multinational enterprises and the oeCD industrial 
relations guidelines (philadelphia, industrial research unit, university of 
pennsylvania) 289 pp.
cannEr, stephen J. (1998): “the multilateral Agreement on investment”, Cornell 
international Law Journal (vol. 31): pp. 657 – 682.
cosbEy, Aaron, mann, howard, pETErson, luke eric and molTkE, Konrad Von 
(2004): investment and sustainable Development: A Guide to the use and 
Potential of international investment Agreements (winnipeg, international 
institute for sustainable development) 46 pp.
cosTamagna F. (2008): “Promozione e protezione degli investimenti esteri nel 
diritto internazionale”, comba, Andrea, canToni, silvia, EglE, granziera, 
manDrino, claudio, orDEnino, Alberto, porchia, ornella, vEllano, michelle, 
viTErbo, Annamaria (editori) neoliberismo internazionale e Global economic 
Governance (turin, giappichelli editore) pp. 245 – 281.
DolzEr, rudolf and schrEuEr, cristoph (2012): Principles of international investment 
Law (oxford, oxford university press) 530 pp.
WallacE, don Jr. and bailEy, david b. (1998): “the inevitability of national 
treatment of foreign direct investment with increasingly few and narrow 
exceptions, Cornell international Law Journal (vol. 31): pp. 615 – 630.
Dupuy, pierre marie (2009): “unification rather than Fragmentation of international 
Law? the Case of international investment Law and Human rights Law”, 
Dupuy, pierre marie, Francioni, francesco and pETErsmann, ernst ulrich 
(editors) Human rights in international investment Law and Arbitration 
(oxford, oxford university press) pp. 45 – 63.
Economou, persefone, Dunning, John and sauvanT, Karl (2008 – 2009): “trends 
and issues in international investment”, Yearbook on international investment 
law & policy: pp. 3 – 33.
Fry, James (2007 – 2008): “international human rights law in investment arbitra-
tion: evidence of international law’s unity”, Duke Journal of Comparative 
& international Law (vol. 18 n° 1): pp. 77 – 149.
21
Ars Boni et Aequi (Año 9 no 1): pp. 9-22 
gEigEr, rainer (1998): “towards a multilateral Agreement on investment”, Cornell 
international Law Journal (vol. 31): pp. 467 – 475.
graham, edward (1998): “regulatory takings, supernational treatment, and the 
multilateral Agreement on investment: issues raised by nongovernmental 
organizations”, Cornell international Law Journal (vol. 31): pp. 599 – 614.
JuillarD p. (1998): “mAi: A european View”, Cornell international Law Journal 
(vol. 31): pp. 477 – 484.
libErTi l. (2007): “investissement et Droits de l’Homme”, in les Aspects nouveaux 
du droit des investissements internationaux, kahn, p. and bEn hamiDa, w 
(eds), Les Aspects nouveaux du Droit des investissements internationaux 
(leiden, martinus nijhoff publishers) pp. 791 – 852.
morgEra, elisa (2006): “An environmental outlook on the oecd guidelines for 
multinational enterprises”, Georgetown international environmental Law 
review (vol. 18 n° 4): pp. 751 – 777.
nascimbEnE, bruno (1984): il trattamento Dello straniero nel Diritto internazionale 
ed europeo (milan, pubblicazioni della facoltà di giurisprudenza) 591 pp.
oEcD (2001): Corporate social responsibility: Partners for Progress (paris, oecd) 
152 pp.
_____ (2006): Annual report on the oeCD guidelines for multinational enterpri-
ses: conducting business in weak governance zones (paris, oecd) 45 pp.
schnEiDErman, david (2000): “investment rules and the new Constitutionalism”, 
Law & social inquiry (vol. 25 n° 3): pp. 757 – 787.
scholz, wesley (1998): “international regulation of foreign direct investment”, 
Cornell international Law Journal (vol. 31): pp. 485 – 490.
sTumbErg, robert (1998): “sovereignty by subtraction: the multilateral Agreement 
on investment”, Cornell international Law Journal (vol. 31): pp. 491 – 598.
TiElEman, Kathia (2000): “the Failure of the Multilateral Agreement on investment 
(MAi) and the absence of a global public policy network”, Case study for the 
un Vision Project on Global Public Policy networks, pp. 6 – 7. disponible 
en <www.globalpublicpolicy.net>, fecha consulta: 28 julio 2012.
22
Tavassi, Jacopo (2013): El rol dE la ocdE En la Elaboración dE normas 
mulTilaTEralEs sobrE invErsionEs ExTranJEras dirEcTas: un conTrasTE
ulbrich, mathias (2004): “enforcing core labour rights through the oecd-
guidelines for multinational enterprises?, Zeitschrift für ausländisches und 
internationales Arbeits und sozialrecht (vol. 18 n° 4): pp: 366 – 384.
unctAd (2011): World investment report 2011: non-equity modes of interna-
tional production and development (new York, united nations) 250 pp.
undp (2007): Asian Foreign Direct investment in Africa: towards a new era 
of Cooperation among Developing Countries (new York, united nations) 
214 pp.
valEnTi, mara (2009): Gi standard di trattamento nell’interpretazione dei trattati 
in materia di investimenti stranieri, (turin, giappichelli editore) 221 pp.
vanDEvElDE, Kenneth J. (1992): united states investment treaties: Policy and 
Practice (deventer, boston, Kluwer law and taxation) 232 pp.
vEnDzulEs, sarah fick (2010): “the struggle for legitimacy in environmental stan-
dards systems”, Colorado Journal of international environmental Law and 
Policy (vol. 21 n° 3): pp. 451 – 489.
zDEnEk, drabek (1998): A Multilateral Agreement on investment: Convincing 
the sceptics (genevé, world trade organization, economic research and 
Analysis division) 19 pp.
CASE LAW CITED
world trade organization, Doha Work Programme, relationship between trade 
and investment (2004): general council decision, August 1st 2004, wt/l/579.
